Triple

T8692821
Position Surface form Disambiguated ID Type / Status
Subject RFC 5011 E206332 entity
Predicate appliesTo P1129 FINISHED
Object Domain Name System Security Extensions E37203 NE FINISHED

How this triple was built (2 steps)

Every LLM step that produced this triple, in pipeline order — named-entity classification, the disambiguation choices (the exact options shown, with the pick highlighted), and the generated description. The batch + timestamp of each is in the Provenance table below.

NER Named-entity recognition gpt-5-mini
Instruction
Given a phrase, classify it is english named entity (e.g., persons, organizations, works of art) in Latin script, or not (e.g., literals, dates, URLs, verbose phrases). For disambiguation, the statement where the phrase occurs as object is also given. Please return a JSON object with `phrase` (string, the phrase being analyzed) and `is_ne` (boolean, indicating whether the phrase is a Named Entity).
Input
Phrase: Domain Name System Security Extensions | Statement: [RFC 5011, appliesTo, Domain Name System Security Extensions]
NED1 Entity disambiguation (via context triple) gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07 
Target entity: Domain Name System Security Extensions
Context triple: [RFC 5011, appliesTo, Domain Name System Security Extensions]
  • A. DNS Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence
    DNS Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence is a DNSSEC extension that uses cryptographic hashing to provide verifiable, secure proof that a requested DNS name or type does not exist without revealing the full contents of a zone.
  • B. Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions
    "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions" is an IETF standards-track document (RFC 4035) that specifies how DNSSEC is operationally implemented and processed by DNS resolvers and authoritative servers.
  • C. DNSSEC chosen
    DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security Extensions) is a suite of specifications that adds cryptographic authentication and integrity protection to DNS data to prevent attacks such as cache poisoning and spoofing.
  • D. Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC
    "Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC" (RFC 5702) is an IETF standards-track document that specifies how to employ SHA-2 hash algorithms with RSA signatures in DNSSEC to enhance the security of DNS authentication.
  • E. DNSSEC root key signing ceremony
    The DNSSEC root key signing ceremony is a highly controlled, regularly scheduled cryptographic event where trusted personnel generate and manage the root cryptographic keys that secure the global Domain Name System.
  • F. None of above.
  • G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.

Provenance (3 batches)

The batch behind each pipeline step, in order, with when it ran. Timestamps are batch-level — stages were processed in waves, so the object chain (NER → NED1 → NEDg → NED2) reads in order, but predicate / elicitation batches can sit in a different wave.

Step Stage Batch ID Status When
creating Elicitation batch_69ca835481fc819084e33d3bc883bfa6 completed March 30, 2026, 2:06 p.m.
NER Named-entity recognition batch_69cc5825385081908dee42cba8e98392 completed March 31, 2026, 11:26 p.m.
NED1 Entity disambiguation (via context triple) batch_69cef3ea2ba08190b8046e703ba7d2d8 completed April 2, 2026, 10:55 p.m.
Created at: March 30, 2026, 6:33 p.m.