Triple

T8619349
Position Surface form Disambiguated ID Type / Status
Subject RFC 5155 E204123 entity
Predicate protocolFamily P4615 FINISHED
Object DNSSEC E37203 NE FINISHED

How this triple was built (2 steps)

Every LLM step that produced this triple, in pipeline order — named-entity classification, the disambiguation choices (the exact options shown, with the pick highlighted), and the generated description. The batch + timestamp of each is in the Provenance table below.

NER Named-entity recognition gpt-5-mini
Instruction
Given a phrase, classify it is english named entity (e.g., persons, organizations, works of art) in Latin script, or not (e.g., literals, dates, URLs, verbose phrases). For disambiguation, the statement where the phrase occurs as object is also given. Please return a JSON object with `phrase` (string, the phrase being analyzed) and `is_ne` (boolean, indicating whether the phrase is a Named Entity).
Input
Phrase: DNSSEC | Statement: [RFC 5155, protocolFamily, DNSSEC]
NED1 Entity disambiguation (via context triple) gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: DNSSEC
Context triple: [RFC 5155, protocolFamily, DNSSEC]
  • A. DNSSEC chosen
    DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security Extensions) is a suite of specifications that adds cryptographic authentication and integrity protection to DNS data to prevent attacks such as cache poisoning and spoofing.
  • B. DNSSEC ZSK
    DNSSEC ZSK (Zone Signing Key) is the cryptographic key used in DNS Security Extensions to sign individual DNS zone data, ensuring the authenticity and integrity of DNS responses.
  • C. DNSKEY
    DNSKEY is a DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) resource record that stores public keys used to verify digital signatures and authenticate DNS data.
  • D. DNSSEC KSK
    The DNSSEC KSK (Key Signing Key) is a long-term cryptographic key used to sign and authenticate a zone’s DNSKEY records, forming the trust anchor at the top of the DNSSEC validation chain.
  • E. DNSSEC root key signing ceremony
    The DNSSEC root key signing ceremony is a highly controlled, regularly scheduled cryptographic event where trusted personnel generate and manage the root cryptographic keys that secure the global Domain Name System.
  • F. None of above.
  • G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.

Provenance (3 batches)

The batch behind each pipeline step, in order, with when it ran. Timestamps are batch-level — stages were processed in waves, so the object chain (NER → NED1 → NEDg → NED2) reads in order, but predicate / elicitation batches can sit in a different wave.

Step Stage Batch ID Status When
creating Elicitation batch_69ca832ceab8819096e4a9f546695079 completed March 30, 2026, 2:05 p.m.
NER Named-entity recognition batch_69cc471458f48190a6d8858f8074727d completed March 31, 2026, 10:13 p.m.
NED1 Entity disambiguation (via context triple) batch_69cecc92beb48190ad406f48e58d9d0c completed April 2, 2026, 8:07 p.m.
Created at: March 30, 2026, 6:26 p.m.