Triple
T338674
| Position | Surface form | Disambiguated ID | Type / Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject | X.509 certificate |
E6784
|
entity |
| Predicate | hasVersion |
P455
|
FINISHED |
| Object | X.509 v3 |
E6784
|
NE FINISHED |
How this triple was built (2 steps)
Every LLM step that produced this triple, in pipeline order — named-entity classification, the disambiguation choices (the exact options shown, with the pick highlighted), and the generated description. The batch + timestamp of each is in the Provenance table below.
NER
Named-entity recognition
gpt-5-mini
Instruction
Given a phrase, classify it is english named entity (e.g., persons, organizations, works of art) in Latin script, or not (e.g., literals, dates, URLs, verbose phrases). For disambiguation, the statement where the phrase occurs as object is also given. Please return a JSON object with `phrase` (string, the phrase being analyzed) and `is_ne` (boolean, indicating whether the phrase is a Named Entity).
Input
Phrase: X.509 v3 | Statement: [X.509 certificate, hasVersion, X.509 v3]
NED1
Entity disambiguation (via context triple)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: X.509 v3 Context triple: [X.509 certificate, hasVersion, X.509 v3]
-
A.
X.509 certificates
chosen
X.509 certificates are digital documents that bind a public key to an entity’s identity using a trusted certificate authority, forming the basis of public key infrastructure for secure communications.
-
B.
PKCS #1
PKCS #1 is a cryptographic standard that defines the mathematical properties, formats, and padding schemes for implementing RSA encryption and digital signatures.
-
C.
RFC 2818
RFC 2818 is the Internet standard that specifies how HTTP is used over TLS/SSL, defining the HTTPS protocol and its security requirements.
-
D.
RFC 5246
RFC 5246 is the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard that specifies Transport Layer Security (TLS) version 1.2, a widely used protocol for securing communications over computer networks.
-
E.
RFC 3526
RFC 3526 is an Internet standard that defines modular exponential (MODP) Diffie–Hellman groups for use in secure key exchange protocols.
- F. None of above.
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
Provenance (3 batches)
The batch behind each pipeline step, in order, with when it ran. Timestamps are batch-level — stages were processed in waves, so the object chain (NER → NED1 → NEDg → NED2) reads in order, but predicate / elicitation batches can sit in a different wave.
| Step | Stage | Batch ID | Status | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| creating | Elicitation | batch_69a2e79434908190a9d5afe415153ad9 |
completed | Feb. 28, 2026, 1:03 p.m. |
| NER | Named-entity recognition | batch_69a2eae3a27c81909fc7deb600125fb1 |
completed | Feb. 28, 2026, 1:17 p.m. |
| NED1 | Entity disambiguation (via context triple) | batch_69a3dd2def2081908bd67a3ae4e93ddf |
completed | March 1, 2026, 6:31 a.m. |
Created at: Feb. 28, 2026, 1:08 p.m.