Triple
T1119780
| Position | Surface form | Disambiguated ID | Type / Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject | expected utility theory |
E11182
|
entity |
| Predicate | formalizedBy |
P8407
|
FINISHED |
| Object | von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem |
E11182
|
NE FINISHED |
How this triple was built (2 steps)
Every LLM step that produced this triple, in pipeline order — named-entity classification, the disambiguation choices (the exact options shown, with the pick highlighted), and the generated description. The batch + timestamp of each is in the Provenance table below.
NER
Named-entity recognition
gpt-5-mini
Instruction
Given a phrase, classify it is english named entity (e.g., persons, organizations, works of art) in Latin script, or not (e.g., literals, dates, URLs, verbose phrases). For disambiguation, the statement where the phrase occurs as object is also given. Please return a JSON object with `phrase` (string, the phrase being analyzed) and `is_ne` (boolean, indicating whether the phrase is a Named Entity).
Input
Phrase: von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem | Statement: [expected utility theory, formalizedBy, von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem]
NED1
Entity disambiguation (via context triple)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem Context triple: [expected utility theory, formalizedBy, von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem]
-
A.
expected utility theory (with John von Neumann)
chosen
Expected utility theory (with John von Neumann) is a foundational framework in economics and decision theory that models how rational agents make choices under uncertainty by maximizing the expected value of a utility function.
-
B.
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior is a foundational 1944 book by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern that established game theory as a rigorous mathematical framework for analyzing strategic decision-making in economics.
-
C.
Nash bargaining solution
The Nash bargaining solution is a foundational concept in game theory that defines a fair and efficient outcome for two-party bargaining problems based on axioms of rationality and symmetry.
-
D.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem
Arrow’s impossibility theorem is a foundational result in social choice theory showing that no voting system can convert individual preferences into a collective ranking while simultaneously satisfying a set of seemingly reasonable fairness criteria.
-
E.
Collective Choice and Social Welfare
Collective Choice and Social Welfare is a foundational work in social choice theory that rigorously examines how individual preferences can be aggregated into collective decisions while addressing issues of welfare, justice, and fairness.
- F. None of above.
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
Provenance (3 batches)
The batch behind each pipeline step, in order, with when it ran. Timestamps are batch-level — stages were processed in waves, so the object chain (NER → NED1 → NEDg → NED2) reads in order, but predicate / elicitation batches can sit in a different wave.
| Step | Stage | Batch ID | Status | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| creating | Elicitation | batch_69a493252a648190ac48f8742474a5e8 |
completed | March 1, 2026, 7:27 p.m. |
| NER | Named-entity recognition | batch_69a4bbbca3348190a607ce147b2ae70e |
completed | March 1, 2026, 10:20 p.m. |
| NED1 | Entity disambiguation (via context triple) | batch_69ac59a62b9c8190938b3c571cd8ff5f |
completed | March 7, 2026, 5 p.m. |
Created at: March 1, 2026, 7:43 p.m.