A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
E324673
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation is a foundational economics book that develops a rigorous principal–agent framework for designing optimal contracts and regulatory mechanisms in public procurement and regulated industries.
All labels observed (1)
| Label | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont) canonical | 2 |
How this entity was disambiguated
This entity first appeared as the object of triple T3081242 — resolving that mention is where its identity was fixed. The disambiguator weighed these candidate entities and picked the highlighted one (or “None”, minting a new entity). This is how homonymy is resolved: the same surface form can point to different entities.
NED1
Entity disambiguation (via context triple)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont) Context triple: [Jean Tirole, notableWork, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)]
-
A.
Walrasian market-clearing framework
The Walrasian market-clearing framework is a general equilibrium model in which perfectly competitive markets continuously adjust prices so that supply equals demand in all markets simultaneously.
-
B.
Nash bargaining solution
The Nash bargaining solution is a foundational concept in game theory that defines a fair and efficient outcome for two-party bargaining problems based on axioms of rationality and symmetry.
-
C.
Rubinstein bargaining model
The Rubinstein bargaining model is a foundational game-theoretic framework that analyzes how two parties reach agreement over time through alternating offers under the influence of impatience and strategic delay.
-
D.
Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy
"Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy" is an influential economic paper that analyzes how different monetary policy regimes and the credibility of policymakers affect inflation and output outcomes.
-
E.
Coase theorem
The Coase theorem is an economic theory stating that if property rights are well-defined and transaction costs are negligible, private bargaining will lead to an efficient allocation of resources regardless of the initial assignment of rights.
- F. None of above. chosen
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
NED2
Entity disambiguation (via description)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont) Target entity description: A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation is a foundational economics book that develops a rigorous principal–agent framework for designing optimal contracts and regulatory mechanisms in public procurement and regulated industries.
-
A.
Walrasian market-clearing framework
The Walrasian market-clearing framework is a general equilibrium model in which perfectly competitive markets continuously adjust prices so that supply equals demand in all markets simultaneously.
-
B.
Nash bargaining solution
The Nash bargaining solution is a foundational concept in game theory that defines a fair and efficient outcome for two-party bargaining problems based on axioms of rationality and symmetry.
-
C.
Rubinstein bargaining model
The Rubinstein bargaining model is a foundational game-theoretic framework that analyzes how two parties reach agreement over time through alternating offers under the influence of impatience and strategic delay.
-
D.
Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy
"Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy" is an influential economic paper that analyzes how different monetary policy regimes and the credibility of policymakers affect inflation and output outcomes.
-
E.
Coase theorem
The Coase theorem is an economic theory stating that if property rights are well-defined and transaction costs are negligible, private bargaining will lead to an efficient allocation of resources regardless of the initial assignment of rights.
- F. None of above. chosen
Statements (45)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
book
ⓘ
economics book ⓘ |
| author |
Jean Tirole
ⓘ
Jean-Jacques Laffont ⓘ |
| countryOfPublication |
United States of America
ⓘ
surface form:
United States
|
| describesConcept |
adverse selection in regulation
ⓘ
auction design for procurement ⓘ incentive-compatible regulation ⓘ information rents ⓘ moral hazard in regulation ⓘ screening contracts ⓘ |
| field |
contract theory
ⓘ
economics ⓘ industrial organization ⓘ microeconomics ⓘ principal–agent theory ⓘ public economics ⓘ regulatory economics ⓘ |
| focusesOn |
design of optimal contracts
ⓘ
public procurement mechanisms ⓘ regulation of natural monopolies ⓘ regulation under asymmetric information ⓘ regulatory mechanisms ⓘ |
| hasTheoreticalFramework |
mechanism design framework
ⓘ
principal–agent framework ⓘ |
| influencedField |
contract theory
ⓘ
industrial organization ⓘ public procurement policy ⓘ regulatory economics ⓘ |
| language | English ⓘ |
| mainSubject |
asymmetric information
ⓘ
incentive theory ⓘ mechanism design ⓘ optimal contracts ⓘ procurement ⓘ public procurement ⓘ regulated industries ⓘ regulation ⓘ |
| notableFor |
formal analysis of optimal regulatory contracts
ⓘ
rigorous treatment of principal–agent problems in regulation ⓘ |
| publicationDecade | 1990s ⓘ |
| publisher | MIT Press ⓘ |
| targetAudience |
graduate students in economics
ⓘ
policy makers in regulation ⓘ researchers in industrial organization ⓘ |
How these facts were elicited
The pipeline generated the facts above by prompting gpt-5.1 with this entity's name + description and the instruction below.
Instruction
You are a knowledge base construction expert. Given a subject entity and a description of it, return factual statements that you know for the subject as a JSON list of dictionaries(triples), where keys must be "subject", "predicate" and "object". The number of facts may be very high, between 25 to 50 or more, for very popular subjects. For less popular subjects, the number of facts can be very low, like 5 or 10. # Requirements - If you don't know the subject at all, return an empty list. - If the subject is not a named entity, return an empty list. - Include at least one triple where predicate is "instanceOf". - Do not get too wordy. - Separate several objects into multiple triples with one object.
Input
Subject: A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont) Description of subject: A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation is a foundational economics book that develops a rigorous principal–agent framework for designing optimal contracts and regulatory mechanisms in public procurement and regulated industries.
Referenced by (2)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.
Jean Tirole
→
notableWork
→
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
ⓘ
Tirole
→
notableWork
→
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
ⓘ
subject surface form:
Jean Tirole